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CONTRACTS V. TORTS: NORTH DAKOTA'S
AFTERMARKET RISK CONTRACT & AFTERMARKET
RISK INSURANCE, PRODUCTS LIABILITY, AND THE
GENERAL AVIATION INDUSTRY
I. INTRODUCTION
The person or business who decides to purchase a general aviation
airplane' pays for a significant insurance premium attached to the price
of the plane.2 This premium reflects approximately one-third of the cost
of the plane, accounting for the expenses that manufacturers of general
aviation aircraft 3 pay for product liability litigation controlled by tort
principles.4 In other words, purchasers pay a premium that allows them
to sue general aviation manufacturers for both pecuniary5 and non-
pecuniary damages 6 in the event of an accident. Yet, purchasers cannot
modify the premium because the state has chosen the premium for them
by forcing general aviation manufacturers to insure against tort liability.
Consequently, the general aviation industry is almost nonexistent
because buyers are unwilling to pay for the state mandated premium.
7
For example, in 1978, before tort law hit its prime, a total of 17,811
1. General aviation airplanes are typically those airplanes designed to carry less than twenty
passengers, but excluded are the large domestic and international commercial airplanes used for
scheduled airline flights. Robert Martin, General Aviation Manufacturing: An Industry Under Siege,
in THE LiABLrrY MAZE 478, 478 (Peter W. Huber & Robert Litan, eds., (1991)). Some examples of
general aviation include air ambulance service, air charter, flight training, pleasure flying, agricultural
aerial application, air taxi, and other aviation activities that do not fall under the category of scheduled
airlines. John H. Boswell & George A. Coats, Saving the General Aviation Industry: Putting Tort
Reform to the Test, 60 J. Am L. & CoM. 533, 535 (1994-95). North Dakota defines general aviation as
aircraft weighing less than 12,500 pounds, "powered and intended to fly above the ground" and
"designed to carry one person or more, but with a maximum seating capacity of fewer than twenty
passengers." N.D. CENT. CODE § 26.1-48-01(2) (1995).
2. George L. Priest, Can Absolute Manufacturer Liability be Defended?, 9 YALE J. ON R FG. 237,
262 (1992).
3. Boswell & Coats, supra note 1, at 535. "The general aviation industry includes manufacturers
of general aviation aircraft, major aircraft components [of general aviation aircraft] (such as engines
and propellers), and small components." Id.
4. Cf. PETER W. HUBER, THE LEGAL REVOLUTION AND ITS CONSEQUENcEs 3-4 (1988) (discussing the
effect of litigation on the cost of products). This cost is called a "tort tax." Id.
5. Pecuniary damages are damages that "can be estimated in and compensated by money" such
as lost wages, medical expenses, and the price of the good. BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 392 (6th ed.
1990).
6. Non-pecuniary damages include injuries that cannot be accurately calculated in monetary
terms such as pain and suffering, loss of pleasure of life, or a lost limb. Compare id. (stating the
definition of pecuniary damages).
7. Cf. George L. Priest, The Current Insurance Crisis and Modern Tort Law, 96 YALE L. J. 1521,
1567 (1987) (noting that several plane models have been taken off the market because the cost of
insurance has so greatly raised the price); James H. Andrews, Injury Lawsuits Said to Cause Financial
Crisis for Many U.S. Companies, CtuIsTLAN SCi. MoNIToR, Jan. 25, 1994, at 11 (noting that difficulty in
obtaining insurance caused Cessna to stop producing single-engine piston aircraft).
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general aviation aircraft were sold.8 "By 1992, only 899 general avia-
tion aircraft were sold." 9 During the past ten years, 100,000 jobs have
been lost in general aviation's service, maintenance, and related indus-
tries.10 In 1992, unemployment in the general aviation industry was over
seventy percent.'l Essentially, the demands of tort law have almost shut
down the entire general aviation industry.
In the late 1980s, an academic movement responded to the crisis by
arguing that contract law should have more presence than tort law in the
area of product liability.12 The application of contract law could provide
general aviation purchasers the choice of whether to pay the insurance
premium tacked on to the price of the plane or to purchase an alternative
insurance plan.13 Also, the application of contract law would allow
purchasers to decide whether to pay for the typical premium in the price
of the product which allows the consumer to recover non-pecuniary
damages or to buy a less expensive premium that limits recovery to
pecuniary damages.14 Essentially, contract principles would give general
aviation manufacturers, sellers, and buyers more autonomy in the
purchase of general aviation aircraft.
In 1995, North Dakota responded to both general aviation's plight
and the academic arguments by providing legislation that attempts to
create a legal atmosphere where general aviation manufacturers may
operate free from most of the demands of tort law.15 This Note discusses
8. S. REP. No. 202, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1993) [hereinafter S. REP. No. 202] (resulting from
proposed eighteen year statute of repose for general aviation aircraft); GENERAL AVIATION M FR.
Ass'N, 1994 GENERAL A VATION STATISTICAL DATABOOK 5 (1994) [hereinafter STATISTICAL DATABOOK].
Approximately seventeen thousand of the aircraft were piston-engined aircraft. S. REP. No. 202,
supra, at 1. Piston-engine aircraft are generally small planes seating four to ten people. Stacy Shapiro,
Tort Costs Hurt Aircraft Manufacturers, Bus. INs., June 10, 1991, at 34.
9. S. REP. No. 202, supra note 8, at 1. Five hundred and fifty-one of the aircraft were piston-
engine aircraft.
10. Id. at 1-2.
11. S. REP. No. 203, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1993) [hereinafter S. REP. No. 203] (responding to
proposed product liability reform).
12. See infra notes 62-65 and accompanying text (defining neocontractual principles on which
their arguments are based).
13. See 2 THE AMERICAN LAW INsTrrTrE, REPORTERS' STUDY ON ENTERPRISE RESPONSBMILIY FOR
PERSONAL INJURY 517-536 (1991) (presenting two insurance schemes involving contract principles and
product liability law).
14. PAUL H. RUBIN, TORT REFORM BY CoNTRAcr 3-6 (1993).
15. N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 26.1-48-01 to -05 (1995). See, e., Bruce Gjovig, High-Flying Business
Opportunities, DAKOTA BUS., Feb. 1995, at 21 (discussing advantages of legislation). Gjovig also points
out that North Dakota is home to Fisher Flying Products, the sixth largest kit aircraft manufacturer out
of 150 in the nation. Id. North Dakota is also home to the largest pilot training center in the country,
the Center for Aerospace Sciences (CAS) at the University of North Dakota, which is in need of a
new fleet of training aircraft. Id. North Dakota hopes these factors coupled with a friendly legal
atmosphere will persuade general aviation manufacturers to locate in North Dakota. Id. In January
1996, Cirrus Design announced its intention to build a multi-million dollar general aviation
manufacturing plant in Grand Forks, North Dakota, that will employ 250 people. Randy Bradbury,
Cirrus to Make Planes in GF, GRAND FORKS HERALD, Jan. 13, 1996, at IA. Cirrus specifically stated
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this new legislation by beginning in Part II with the history of general
aviation's struggle with tort law and the history of the relief that contract
law offers to the industry. Part III analyzes the characteristics and
legality of an Aftermarket Risk Contract (ARC) and offers potential
clauses and agreements that may become part of an Aftermarket Risk
Contract. Part IV analyzes the characteristics and legality of an After-
market Risk Insurance Policy (ARIP) and demonstrates how an insur-
ance plan utilizing contract principles may withstand legal scrutiny. Part
V concludes that despite any weaknesses, North Dakota's ARC and ARIP
provide a workable solution based on contract law to relieve general
aviation's struggle with the unpredictable demands of tort law.
The first part of the legislation creates an Aftermarket Risk Contract
that covers general aviation transactions in North Dakota.16 The ARC
creates a choice-of-law clause where the buyer and seller agree to be
bound by North Dakota law so that the parties may export North Dako-
ta's disputable presumption,1 7 state-of-art defense,18 and statute of
repose' 9 to states other than North Dakota. 20 The ARC also attempts to
export the principle that contract law should have more dominance in
product liability law.21 Whether North Dakota may export their laws and
principles depends on whether a foreign state will utilize overriding
fundamental policy exceptions to refuse such an application.22
In addition to the choice-of-law clause, the buyer and seller are free
to negotiate their liability instead of paying the traditional premium
tacked on to the price of the plane. 23 In short, an ARC is based on the
principle that a buyer and seller should hammer out financial risks and
liabilities in the contract prior to the purchase of an aircraft. 24
that North Dakota's legislation played a key role in the company's decision to move to Grand Forks.
Id. at 9A.
16. N.D. CENT. CODE § 26.1-48-02 (1995); HR. 1243,54th Leg. Session, 1995 N.D. Laws 873.
17. N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-01.4-02 (Supp. 1995). The disputable presumption provides that the
general aviation aircraft is free from defects if the aircraft is in compliance with federal standards.
Id.
18. § 28-01.4-03. The state-of-art defense absolves the manufacturer of liability for a defective
product if the general aviation aircraft is the safest aircraft or component part on the market at the
time of manufacture. Id.
19. § 28-01.4-04. The statute of repose provides that a person cannot sue a general aviation
manufacturer more than ten years after the date the aircraft is delivered to the first purchaser. Id.
20. See § 26.1-48-02 (providing that the buyer and seller must agree to be bound by North
Dakota law).
21. Telephone Interview with Dwight M. Baumann, Professor of Engineering Design, Carnegie
Mellon University, Pittsburgh, PA (Oct. 28, 1995) [hereinafter Baumann].
22. See infra notes 133-35 and accompanying text (outlining how courts rely on public policy to
review the validity of a clause choosing North Dakota).
23. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 26.1-48-02, -04 (Supp. 1995) (providing the requirements of an ARC,
but not placing limitations on the other clauses the contracting parties wish to add to the ARC).
24. Stephen Baker et al., Clearing a Runway for Planemakers, Bus. WK., Mar. 20, 1995, at 94
[hereinafter Baker]. North Dakota maintains that the root of the problems associated with product
liability law is tort law's ascendancy over contract law. Id.
NOTE 665
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The second part of the legislation is triggered when the parties do
not enter into an ARC. The buyer is then obligated to show proof of a
fully paid ARIP25 holding all general aviation manufacturers harmless,26
thus enabling the seller to remove the price of the premium from the
cost of the plane.27 Consequently, in the absence of an ARC, the manu-
facturer is still protected from unlimited liability, the consumer has a
source of recovery in the event of an accident, and the price of the plane
is significantly decreased.
Thus far, North Dakota's ARC and ARIP statutes are viewed as
novel and innovative laws. 28 These statutes, however, have not been
tested in court. Consequently, the purpose of this Note is to predict how
an ARC or ARIP will stand up against legal scrutiny, and to suggest what
types of clauses and agreements could be part of an ARC or ARIP.
II. DEVELOPMENT OF NORTH DAKOTA'S AFTERMARKET
RISK CONTRACTS AND AFTERMARKET RISK INSURANCE
A. HISTORY OF GENERAL AvIATION'S RELATIONSHIP WITH TORT AND
CONTRACT LAW
1. Federal and State Law and the General Aviation Industry
The general aviation industry is subject to the Federal Aviation Act
of 195829 which directs the Federal Aviation Agency (FAA) to regulate
"air commerce in a way that best promotes its development and safe-
ty." 30 Though this Act seems far reaching, it does not preempt state
common law; instead, state common law stands side-by-side with the
system of federal regulations that Congress has created. 31 Thus, the
general aviation industry is subject to both federal regulations and state
law.
25. N.D. CENT. CODE § 26.1-48-03 (1995) (setting out requirements for ARIPs). See also infra
text accompanying note 103 (setting out the ARC statute, section 26.1-48-02 of the North Dakota
Century Code).
26. § 26.1-48-03(1).
27. See § 26.1-48-02, -03 (implying that a seller will decrease the cost of general aviation
aircraft in exchange for the purchaser's agreement to absolve the manufacturer of all liability).
28. Baker, supra note 24, at 94; Gjovig, supra note 15, at 21; Martha Middleton, A Changing
Landscape, A.B.A. J., Aug. 1995, at 57; William B. Scott, North Dakota Creates Aircraft Safe Haven,
AViATIO4 WK. & SPACE TECH., Aug. 7, 1995, at 52.
29. Pub. L. No. 85-726, 72 Stat. 731 (1958) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 49
U.S.C.).
30. 49 U.S.C. § 40101(d)(l) (1994).
31. Cleveland v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 985 F.2d 1438, 1444 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct.
291 (1993); see also Shari L. Pitko, Comment, Aviation Law: Preemption of State Law Tort Claims by
the Federal Aviation Act-Do State Law Tort Claims Survive the Attack?, 33 WAsHBuRN U. 234, 241-42
(1993) (commenting on Cleveland).
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"Since the early 1960's, courts have steadily expanded tort liability
for injuries suffered in the context of product and service use." 32
Expanded liability ensures all victims, regardless of wealth, recovery for
product-related accidents. 33 The fundamental concept of this movement,
known as enterprise liability, is that manufacturers should pay for
insurance premiums to cover consumer injuries resulting from product
and service use. 34 Yet, the consumer pays the premium because the
manufacturer adds its liability costs to the product or service price.35
The courts implemented the theory of enterprise liability by elimi-
nating privity, 36 creating strict liability, 37 limiting the defense of assump-
tion of risk and product misuse,38 relaxing the causation requirements,39
and accepting comparative negligence. 40 Consequently, tort law has
dominated consumer-manufacturer relationships since the early 1960s.41
The general aviation industry was hit hard by the expansion of tort
liability.4 2 In the 1980s, and early 1990s, a rash of tort lawsuits hit the
general aviation industry43 causing the industry's liability insurance to
32. Priest, supra note 7, at 1534.
33. Id. at 1525, 1534-36. By increasing the liability of manufacturers, state courts intended to
motivate manufacturers to make safe products and to provide insurance for injuries that could not be
prevented. Id. at 1534.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 1535. See also HUBER, supra note 4, at 3-4 (calling the increased price a "tort tax").
Not only has the "tax" increased the price of general aviation aircraft, but it also accounts for over
95% of the price of child vaccines, adds $300 to the cost of having a baby, accounts for 30% of the
price of a stepladder, and overall, costs businesses, governments, and individuals in the United States
over $80 billion a year. Id. However, the statistic that tort liability costs America over $80 billion a
year has been criticized as inflated and unfounded. Milo Geyelin, Tort Bar's Scourge: Star of Legal
Reform Kindles Controversy but Collects Critics, WALL ST. J., Oct. 16, 1992 at Al, A4.
36. See, eg., Henningson v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 161 A.2d 69 (NJ. 1960) (allowing non-
privity party to collect damages).
37. E.g., Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods. Co., 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1962) (adopting strict liability
for manufacturers).
38. E.g., Duncan v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 665 S.W.2d 414 (Tex. 1984) (finding that assumption of
risk and misuse are no longer separate defenses).
39. See, e.g., Sindell v. Abbott Lab., 607 P.2d 924 (Cal.) (creating market share liability), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980).
40. E.g., Daly v. General Motors Corp., 575 P.2d 1162 (Cal. 1978) (holding that principles of
comparative negligence applied to actions founded on strict products liability).
41. Priest, supra note 7, at 1534.
42. See Priest, supra note 2. at 259 (arguing that expanded liability has adversely affected the
general aviation industry). But see Steven P. Croley & Jon D. Hanson, What Liability Crisis? An
Alternative Explanation for Recent Events in Products Liability, 8 YALE J. ON R E. 1, 84-90 (1991)
(agreeing that expanded liability has hit certain industries hard, but arguing that the impact has
increased social welfare).
43. See Boswell & Coats, supra note 1, at 542-47 (listing a number of cases where crashes were
determined to be caused by pilot error, yet million dollar lawsuits were filed against general aviation
manufacturers); see also Cleveland v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 890 F.2d 1540, 1542-43, 1556-57 (10th
Cir. 1989) (noting that jury determined damages of $2.5 million resulting mostly from crash worthiness
negligence even though pilot modified the plane and was negligent in operating the plane, but vacating
and remanding because of erroneous special verdict form); Datskow v. Teledyne Continental Motors
Aircraft Prods., 826 F. Supp. 677, 689, 698 (W.D.N.Y. 1993) (observing jury award of $107 million
for pain and suffering as extraordinarily high, and granting new trial on damages unless plaintiffs
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increase dramatically.44 For example, from 1976 to 1986, the expenses
for paid claims and defense costs for manufacturers of light aircraft
airframes, propellers, powerplants, avionics, and other component parts
rose from $24 million per year to $210 million per year.45 During a
four-year period in the late eighties, Beech Aircraft was sued 203 times,
expending over $107 million in defense costs for an average expenditure
of $530,000 per case. 46 Beech Aircraft defended these lawsuits and
ultimately Beech was found not to be at fault in any of the cases. 47
Consequently, manufacturers have had to dramatically raise their prices
to keep up with liability costs.
The impact of the lawsuits on the general aviation industry has been
harsh. 48 Cessna, one of the largest manufacturers of general aviation
aircraft, dropped completely out of the general aviation business in
198649 and Piper has been in bankruptcy since 1991.50 Beech Aircraft
continues to stay aloft, but in 1992 the company manufactured only
eighteen percent of the general aviation aircraft it made in 1978.51
While the general aviation industry continues to decline, the public still
demands general aviation airplanes 52 and the industry maintains a vital
role in the nation's transportation system.53
In 1994, the United States Congress responded to the disparity
between the demand for small aircraft and the industry's decline by
passing the General Aviation Revitalization Act. 54 The Act intended to
assist the industry by barring civil tort actions against manufacturers
after eighteen years have passed from the date of delivery to the first
purchaser. 55 Before the Act, a plane manufactured in 1939 presented
agreed to remittitur).
44. Priest, supra note 7, at 1521.
45. S. REP. No. 202, supra note 8, at 3. Martin, supra note 1, at 484-85.
46. Chuck Stewart, Land of Opportunity, AIR PROGRESS, Aug. 15, 1995 at 12. Congress asked
Beech Aircraft to analyze 203 lawsuits filed against Beech. Martin, supra note 1, at 485. All of the
accidents in the study were investigated by the National Transportation Safety Board and the Federal
Aviation Administration. Id. These investigations concluded that pilot error was responsible for 118
of the 203 accidents. Id. Maintenance and weather accounted for another 43 of the accidents. Id.
47. Boswell & Coats, supra note 1, at 548 n.86 (citing Martin, supra note 1).
48. Other industries hit hard by tort law include manufacturers of vaccines, sports equipment, ski
lifts, IUDs, and the commercial trucking industry. Priest, supra note 7, at 1521. Professions such as
medicine have also been affected. Id. at 1526.
49. S. REp. No. 202, supra note 8, at 3.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. The United States, as of 1993, had over 600,000 active pilots who fly general aviation air-
craft over 25 million hours annually. STATISTICAL DATABOOK, supra note 8, at 12, 15-16.
53. General aviation also serves over 5,000 public airports throughout the nation. Id. at 20-21.




the same product liability risk as a new plane. 56  Now, the general
aviation industry is protected from liability after a reasonable amount of
time.57 Yet, the general aviation industry is still exposed to the same tort
liability for aircraft less than eighteen years old.58 Thus, despite the
federal government's efforts, a significant portion of the general aviation
industry is still confronted with the same tort law that has nearly shut
down the entire industry. 59
2. Contracts as a Participant with Torts in Product Liability
Law
As previously mentioned, the main culprit for general aviation's
decline is the imposition of enterprise liability.60 Recently, states have
backed away from this position while implementing tort reform by
capping damages, reforming joint tortfeasor liability, and limiting strict
liability. 6' In addition to typical tort reforms, a neocontractual move-
ment has developed without much opposition.62 The movement argues
that product liability law should include principles of contract law63 and
proposes that manufacturers, sellers, and consumers should be allowed to
allocate liability in a contract rather than on tort law.64 The movement
56. Boswell & Coats, supra note 1, at 554. In 1994, the average age of a general aviation
aircraft was 27 years old and one-third of the general aviation fleet is over 32 years old. STATISTICAL
DATABOOK, supra note 8, at 11; S REP. No. 202, supra note 8, at 3. Compare this to the shorter life of
products such as cars and appliances. Boswell & Coats, supra note 1, at 553.
57. 49 U.S.C. § 40101 (1991).
58. See supra notes 32-42 and accompanying text (discussing liability to which the general
aviation manufacturer is subject).
59. S. RaP. No. 202, supra note 8, at 3 (stating that the average age of general aviation aircraft is
27 years). Even though more than half of the general aviation industry will not be protected from
liability under the General Aviation Revitalization Act, the industry is expected to gear up production
again. Boswell & Coats, supra note 1, at 556. Based on this Act, Cessna's chairman stated that Cessna
will begin manufacturing light aircraft again, and will build 2,000 planes in the first year of renewed
manufacturing. Id. But note that each of these planes will be exposed to full liability for the first
eighteen years of use. 49 U.S.C. § 40101 (1991).
60. See supra notes 32-35 and accompanying text (discussing enterprise liability and laws based
on enterprise liability adopted by states).
61. Middleton, supra note 28, at 56-61.
62. But see Croley & Hanson, supra note 42, at 8 (arguing that "courts should complete the shift
towards enterprise liability").
63. See Patricia M. Danzon, Tort Reform and the Role of Government in Private Insurance Mar-
kets, 13 J. LaGAL STUD. 517, 518-19 (1984) (stating that a victim's compensatory award should be
determined by the amount of insurance he or she would have chosen prior to the accident); Richard A.
Epstein, The Unintended Revolution in Product Liability Law, 10 CARDOZO L. REv. 2193, 2202 (1989)
(stating that tort law's anti-contract bias has had a devastating effect on product liability law); Mark
Geistfeld, The Political Economy of Neocontractual Proposals for Products Liability Reform, 72 TEx. L.
REv. 803, 807 (1994) (defining a neocontract); Peter Huber, Flypaper Contracts and the Genesis of
Modern Tort Law, 10 CARDozo L. REV. 2263 (1989) (outlining a detailed history of contract law's
demise).
64. Geistfeld, supra note 63, at 808. Geistfeld adopted the term "neocontracts" from Peter
Huber. Id. at 804 n.4.
NOTE 669
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does not eliminate torts in most proposals; instead, the movement pro-
poses tort reform by allowing contract principles to participate with tort
law in product liability litigation. 65
The neocontractual movement challenges tort law's basic principle
that manufacturers, not consumers, should insure for injuries resulting
from product use.66 This insurance plan is called third-party insurance.
Under third-party insurance, the injured person relies on a third party to
provide insurance to cover injuries. The premium and damages are
determined and administered by the courts. 67 Thus, the main criticism
of third-party insurance is that manufacturers' liability is determined by
courts and damages awarded by juries. 68 As a result, neither the con-
sumer nor the manufacturer can negotiate a limit on an insurance policy,
which results in the manufacturer being subject to uncertain and almost
unlimited liability.69
Neocontracts, on the other hand, would allow consumers to pur-
chase first-party insurance to cover injuries under product liability law.70
One of the benefits of first-party insurance is that it allows the insurer to
deal with insureds individually; whereas tort law combines all consumers
into one group, regardless of legitimate differences and risks.7 1 For
example, first-party insurance allows insurers to consider differences
such as wealth, age, and experience, while allowing the insured to be
grouped into levels of risks. 72 Creating different risk pools allows the
insurer to predict a premium that reflects that risk.73 Third-party insur-
ance, on the other hand, cannot predict risk efficiently because all
insureds and their risks are lumped together. 74 Consequently, the insurer
cannot predict a premium that reflects their risks accurately. 75 Lack of
predictability may force the insurer to overprice the premium charged to
65. RutaN, supra note 14, at 3-6. Rubin proposes that contractual tort reform is simple to
implement because parties may voluntarily write the contracts they desire without having to wait for
legislation. Id. at 9-10.
66. George L. Priest, The Invention of Enterprise Liability: A Critical History of the Intellectual
Foundation of Modern Tort Law, 14 J. LEGAL STuD. 461,462-64 (1985).
67. Priest, supra note 7, at 1548.
68. RICHARD A. EPTEIN, S mLE RULEs FOR A COMPLEX WORLD 244-45 (1995). Non-pecuniary
damages are not traded on the market so there is no certain value to which juries can refer in assess-
ing such damages. RuaN, supra note 14, at 58.
69. See Richard A. Epstein, Products Liability as an Insurance Market, 14 J. LEGAL STuD. 645,
668 (1985) (stating that third party insurance is dependent on a jury estimate of almost unlimited actual
and punitive damages). It would be more sensible for "the contingency of an accident [to] be
addressed ahead of time, when tempers are cool and minds clear." Huber, supra note 63, at 2267.
70. Priest, supra note 7, at 1582-83.
71. Id. at 1571.
72. Id . at 1542.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Priest, supra note 7, at 1542-43.
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the manufacturer. This in turn affects the consumer's price of the
product.
Neocontracts are also based on the premise that consumers do not
desire to pay for the extra insurance tacked on to the price of a product
to cover non-pecuniary damages such as pain and suffering or hedonic
damages.76 Under economic theory "[p]ecuniary losses shift the
consumer downward along a utility function and thus increase the
marginal utility of wealth. It is therefore desirable to insure against
pecuniary losses .... Nonpecuniary losses, conversely, do not increase
the marginal utility of wealth." 77 For example, life insurance may be
purchased to cover a breadwinner whose death would cause the family to
suffer pecuniary losses such as lost wages. These lost wages have high
marginal utility.78 Life insurance, on the other hand, is not necessarily
purchased for a child; even though the family suffers non-pecuniary
damages, such as pain and suffering. 79 It appears that if consumers were
given the choice, they would be willing to pay for insurance that covers
pecuniary damages, such as medical costs and lost wages, but would
accept the risk of not being able to recover for non-pecuniary damages
such as pain and suffering.8 0
In short, neocontracts allow consumers to be a part of the equation
that determines liability. The neocontractual theory also demonstrates
how consumers are benefitted when contract law becomes part of prod-
uct liability law. North Dakota is attempting to provide a legal atmo-
sphere where the general aviation industry may regain its strength and
meet society's demand for general aviation aircraft by adopting many
neocontractual principles.81
B. NORTH DAKOTA'S RESPONSE TO GENERAL AVIATION'S STRUGGLE
WITH TORT LAW
North Dakota's version of product liability tort reform based on
neocontractual principles provides an Aftermarket Risk Contract (ARC)
76. RUBIN, supra note 14, at 29-48; Priest, supra note 7, at 1546-47. There is no market available
for pain and suffering insurance. Priest, supra note 7, at 1547.
77. RUBIN, supra note 14, at 36.
78. Priest, supra note 7, at 1546-47.
79. Id.
80. Ruant, supra note 14, at 39-40. This conclusion is based on the consumer's behavior before
the accident occurs (ex ante). Id. at 29. After the accident occurs (ex post), the consumer will most
often take whatever the court will give. Id. at 29-30.
81. Boswell & Coats, supra note 1, at 541. "General aviation aircraft fly over 30 million hours
annually, carrying 120 million passengers over 4 billion miles ... [and] provides the exclusive means
of transportation for over 5,000 communities." Id.
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and an Aftermarket Risk Insurance Policy (ARIP).82 In addition to
adopting neocontractual principles, North Dakota's ARC and ARIP are
expected to create a favorable environment to entice general aviation
manufacturers to set up shop in North Dakota.83 Prior to North Dako-
ta's legislation, the state maintained the same tort law that adversely
hindered the general aviation industry.84 Now, in an ARC, a general
aviation seller and buyer may agree upon liability before the purchase of
a general aviation aircraft rather than paying the premium previously
mandated by tort law. For example, if the manufacturer decreased the
price of a plane by $40,000 in exchange for relief from liability for
non-pecuniary damages, the number of purchasers would probably
increase, which in turn would probably increase the number of planes
manufactured.
In addition to the ability to contractually determine liability, an
ARC attempts to export to other states the neocontractual principles
behind the ARC.8 5 The ARC accomplishes this goal by mandating that
parties in an ARC be bound by North Dakota law in their ARC.86 The
choice-of-law clause also attempts to export North Dakota's product
liability laws specifically tailored for the general aviation industry.8 7
These statutes include a disputable presumption,88 a state-of-art defense8 9
82. N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 26.1-48-01 to -05 (1995). See infra text accompanying note 103 (setting
forth language of North Dakota Century Code section 26.1-48-02).
83. LEGISLATiVE COUNCIL OF N.D., REPORT TO THE 54TH LEG. ASSEMBLY, at 169-70 (1995); Baker,
supra note 24, at 94; Gjovig, supra note 15, at 21.
84. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-03.2-02 (Supp. 1995) (governing the doctrine of comparative neg-
ligence); Johnson v. American Motors Corp., 225 N.W.2d 57, 66 (N.D. 1974) (adopting strict liability
in tort); Wentz v. Deseth, 221 N.W.2d 101, 104-05 (N.D. 1974) (adopting the doctrine of comparative
negligence to ameliorate the effects of assumption of risk); Lang v. General Motors Corp., 136
N.W.2d 805, 810 (N.D. 1965) (eliminating the requirement of privity).
85. Baumann, supra note 21.
86. N.D. CENT. CODE § 26.1-48-02 (1995).
87. §§ 28-01.4-01 to -04 (Supp. 1995). A complete discussion of these statutes is beyond the
scope of this note, but they are discussed to illustrate why the parties entering into an Aftermarket Risk
Contract would want to be bound by North Dakota law.
88. § 28-01.4-02. This section provides "a disputable presumption that a product is free from any
defect or defective condition if the product was in compliance with . . . [glovernment standards" or
"applicable industry standards." Id. The presumption "is not available if the plaintiff proves by clear
and convincing evidence that the aviation manufacturer or product seller ... made misrepresentations,
... committed fraud, or concealed evidence." Id. The statute also provides an absolute defense to
any product liability action if the pilot "used alcohol or illicit drugs while operating or using an aircraft
or aircraft component." Id. Oregon also provides a product liability statute with a similar
presumption, that the product "is not unreasonably dangerous for its intended use." OR. REv. STAT. §
30.910 (1995). North Dakota's and Oregon's statutes apparently have not been scrutinized by the
courts.
89. N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-01.4-03. This section provides that a general aviation manufacturer or
seller cannot "be held liable for any personal injury, death, or damage to property" caused by a
"defect in a state-of-the-art product." Id; see Hohlenkamp v. Rheem Mfg. Co., 655 P.2d 32, 37 (Ariz.
Ct. App. 1982) (allowing state-of-art evidence to show whether product was defective and
unreasonably dangerous); FMC Corp. v. Brown, 526 N.E.2d 719, 729 (Ind. 1988) (stating that
state-of-art defense in product liability action is a statutory affirmative defense); Fell v. Kewanee
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and a statute of repose.90 Thus, if the choice-of-law clause is honored in
other states, parties with an ARC suffering an accident in North Dakota
or a state other than North Dakota will have the benefit of North Dako-
ta's product liability laws.
If either party refuses to enter into an ARC, the buyer must then
provide proof of a fully paid ARIP.91 The ARIP holds harmless all
general aviation manufacturers 92 and can include other clauses agreed to
by the contracting parties.93 This plan allows sellers of general aviation
aircraft to offer the aircraft to the buyer at a lower price because the
seller is "held harmless."
In sum, North Dakota allows parties involved in the purchase and
manufacture of general aviation aircraft to take advantage of North
Dakota law. The parties are allowed to freely negotiate liability rather
than being forced to adhere solely to tort doctrines. Whether North
Dakota's novel approach to product liability law will withstand legal
scrutiny, however, is subject to debate.
C. LEGISLATIVE DEBATE: OPPONENTS AND PROPONENTS
Prior to the adoption of North Dakota's new ARC and ARIP laws,
concerns with an ARC or ARIP were voiced by the North Dakota Trial
Lawyers Association (NDTLA).94 One concern was the constitutionality
of the law. The NDTLA argued that an ARC "probably violates the
prohibition against unfair restraint of trade and interferes with the
protections of interstate commerce provided under the U.S. Constitu-
Farm Equip. Co., 457 N.W.2d 911, 920 (Iowa 1990) (stating that state-of-art defense is a complete
defense against liability for design defects); Spieker v. Westgo, Inc., 479 N.W.2d 837, 844 (N.D.
1992) (finding that trial court did not err by not giving state-of-the-art instruction in strict liability
case).
90. N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-01.4-04. This section provides that no claim for damages may arise
after the useful safe life of the aircraft or component part. Id. Also, a disputable presumption that the
useful safe life has expired is created ten years after the first delivery of the aircraft. Id. In 1993,
fourteen states had "statutes of repose in effect, most of which are shorter than 15 years and typically
range between 6 and 12 years." S. REP. 202, supra note 8, at 3 n.12. State statutes of repose have been
found both constitutional and unconstitutional. Compare Dague v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 418 N.E.2d
207, 212-15 (Ind. 1981) (holding that a 10 year statute of repose is constitutional and that the state
supreme court is not in office to question the wisdom of the legislature's enactments) with Berry v.
Beech Aircraft Corp, 717 P.2d 670,680 (Utah 1985) (finding a 10 year statute of limitation unconstitu-
tional because it violates the open court provisions and guarantees accorded in a wrongful death
action).
91. N.D. CENT CODE § 26.1-48-02.
92. § 26.1-48-03(1).
93. §§ 26.1-48-03 to -04 (providing the requirements of an ARIP and limiting additional clauses
and agreements to the confines of insurance law).
94. Hearings on H.B. 1051 and H.B. 1243 Before the Senate Judiciary Committee, 54th Leg.,
Sess. 3, 1-14 (1995) (statement of Sharon Gallagher, of the North Dakota Trial Lawyers Association )
[hereinafter Gallagher]. Gallagher also argued that the disputable presumption is poor public policy
and that the state-of-art defense and statute of repose are unconstitutional. Id. at 2-14.
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tion." 95 For example, a citizen's freedom to travel could be inhibited
by having to show proof of an ARIP prior to boarding the plane.
96
Another of NDTLA's concerns involved conflicts of law. The
NDTLA argued that North Dakota is not free to impose its law on the
other forty-nine states because federalism will not allow one state to
impose its will on another state. 97 Additionally, NDTLA argued that
instead of reduced product liability litigation, the ARC and ARIP will
create an "avalanche of litigation" based on contract law.98 Thus, the
opponents argued that the law is not workable.
Proponents for the law did not voice an opinion on the constitution-
ality of an ARC or ARIP. Instead, they argued that an ARC is a contract
based on sound public policy similar to a marriage license, an auto
insurance policy, a pre-nuptial agreement, or a will. 99 Since contracts
based on sound public policy are able to cross state lines without much
resistance, an ARC should be able to do the same.100
The proponents utilized South Dakota's usury laws as an example
of state legislation that was upheld in other states. 10 1 Also, it can be
argued that insurance companies may be more willing to insure the risks
of aviation under a plan that limits liability and allows the company to
identify and pool its risks.102 Thus, if an ARC or ARIP meets North
Dakota's expectations of allowing contract law more say in product
liability law, the general aviation industry may find safe haven in North
Dakota. If contract law enters into product-related accidents, North Da-
kota's law will be one more step in neocontract's continued march to
tort reform by contract.
III. AFTERMARKET RISK CONTRACT: CHOICE OF LAW CLAUSE
AND OTHER CHARACTERISTICS
North Dakota's Aftermarket Risk Contract statute provides the
following stipulations:
95. Id. at 3, 13.
96. Id. at 13.
97. Id.
98. Gallagher, supra note 94, at 13.
99. Baker, supra note 24, at 94.
100. Id.
101. Gjovig, supra note 15, at 21. But, South Dakota's usury laws are not analogous to North Da-
kota's ARC. See Marquette Nat'l Bank v. First of Omaha Serv. Corp., 439 U.S. 299, 308 (1978)
(stating that "a national bank may charge interest 'on any loan' at the rate allowed by the laws of the
State in which the bank is 'located') (quoting National Bank Act, 12 U.S.C. § 85 (1989)). North
Dakota's ARC provisions have not received the same backing as interstate banking.
102. Hearings on H.B. 1051 and H.B. 1243 Before the Senate Judiciary Committee, 54th Leg.,
Sess. 3 (1995) (statement of Gary Ness, Director of the North Dakota Aeronautics Commission).
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The sale of aircraft and aircraft components sold by an aviation
manufacturer and the performance of any modification, main-
tenance, alteration, repair, or installation of components in
aircraft in this state [North Dakota] are governed by an after-
market risk contract. The contract between the seller or avia-
tion manager and the purchaser must be executed at the time
of purchase and reconsidered at each subsequent resale. The
first and subsequent seller or aviation manufacturer shall agree
to be bound by North Dakota law and the aftermarket risk
contract or to provide a fully paid aftermarket product liability
insurance policy that covers exposure to tort liability within the
United States. The option of providing the insurance policy
applies only to aircraft or aircraft components that sell for
more than two thousand dollars.103
The basic premise of an ARC is that parties should be allowed to
specify by contract the types of damages for which the parties will be
liable. 104 This premise focuses on situations where there is a relationship
between parties prior to an accident leading to product liability litiga-
tion.105 Those situations are normally between buyer and seller. An
ARC requires the buyer and seller to enter into an ARC and be governed
by North Dakota law. 106 The ARC also allows those parties to add to the
ARC other clauses and agreements. 07
The parties are therefore bound by North Dakota law as a means to
export to other states the neocontractual principles North Dakota has
adopted. 0 8 The clause also intends to export North Dakota's product
liability laws.109 Yet, a state other than North Dakota could void the
choice-of-law clause. If the choice-of-law clause in an ARC is not
honored in a another state, then North Dakota's disputable presumption,
statute of repose, and state-of-art defense are of no avail. But, the choice
of-law clause may compel courts to consider neocontractual principles.
Thus, the focus of the discussion about an ARC is on the choice-of-law
clause.
103. N.D. CENT. CODE § 26.1-48-02 (1995).
104. See RUBIN, supra note 14, at 8 (advocating allowing parties "to specify by contract or war-
ranty the types of damages for which injurers will be liable").
105. Harm inflicted on third parties will normally be covered by tort law.
106. N.D. CEr. CODE §26.1-48-02.
107. Id.
108. Baumann. supra note 21.
109. ND. CENT. CODE §§ 28-01.4-01 to -04 (Supp. 1995). See supra notes 88-89 and accompany-
ing text (summarizing the disputable presumption, state-of-art defense, and statute of repose).
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A. WILL THE CHOICE-OF-LAW CLAUSE FLY?
1. The Constitutionality of a Choice-of-Law Clause 10
In the last twenty-five years, the Supreme Court addressed the
constitutional limitations on choice-of-law ruleslll in Allstate Insurance
Co. v. Hague 1 2 and in Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts.1 3 In both
cases, the Court ruled that the conflict-of-law issue should be governed
by state law.114 Still, two federal constitutional provisions have been
recognized as playing a role in the choice-of-law issue: the Due Process
Clause and the Full Faith and Credit Clause.' 1 5 In the context of choice-
of-law, the Supreme Court has ruled that both clauses require similar
analysis."l 6
In Hague, the plaintiff-decedent's wife argued that Minnesota's law
should apply even though the car accident at issue occurred in Wisconsin
and all persons in the accident, including the decedent, were Wisconsin
residents.117 The Court ruled that the Due Process Clause requires
significant contacts between the state and the contracting parties or with
the occurrence that spawned the litigation."i 8 In Hague, the only con-
tacts between Minnesota and the litigation were the decedent's employ-
ment in Minnesota, Allstate's business presence in Minnesota, and the
decedent's wife's residence in Minnesota. 119 The Court found the
aggregation of these contacts sufficient to overcome Due Process con-
cerns and that it was fair to allow Minnesota to apply Minnesota law.120
In the context of an ARC, the forum state is requested to apply
North Dakota's law. In Hague, the Court stated that, "for a State's
110. For simplicity, the following terms and definitions will be used: (l)forum state refers to the
state where the litigation takes place; (2) foreign state law refers to a law from a state other than the
forum state; (3) and contractual choice-of-law refers to a clause in a contract stating which law should
govern the contract or parts of the contract as opposed to a choice-of-forum clause that determines
which court will have jurisdiction over the issues raised by the parties in their contract.
I 1l. Edith Friedler, Party Autonomy Revisited: A Statutory Solution to a Choice-of-Law Problem,
37 U. KAN. L. REV. 471,499 (1989) (citing Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797 (1985) and
Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302 (1981)).
112. 449 U.S. 302 (1981).
113. 472 U.S. 797 (1985).
114. See, e.g., Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 307 (1981) (deferring to state's choice-
of-law rules where aggregation of contracts is sufficient to overcome Due Process concerns).
115. See, e.g., id. at 302.
116. Id. at 308 n.10 (abandoning the weighing-of-interests requirement under the Full Faith and
Credit Clause). But see id. at 320-32 (Stevens, J. concurring) (attempting to distinguish the roles of the
Due Process Clause and the Full Faith and Credit Clause).
117. Id. at 305.
118. Id. at 312-13.
119. Hague, 449 U.S. at 313-19.
120. Id. at 320.
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substantive law to be selected in a constitutionally permissible manner,
that State must have a significant contact or significant aggregation of
contacts, creating state interests, such that choice of its law is neither
arbitrary nor fundamentally unfair."121 The Supreme Court did not
limit the State to the forum state, rather the State could be a foreign state
such as North Dakota. As a result, the Court's analysis of a choice-
of-law clause could apply to an ARC. Thus, under Hague, in order for a
forum state to apply North Dakota's substantive law, it must find that
North Dakota has significant contacts with the parties or the occurrence
giving rise to the litigation. If such contacts are found, the forum state's
application of North Dakota law is constitutionally sound.
One interpretation of Hague is that the Court's finding of sufficient
significant contacts 122 is so strained that one could have the impression
that there is virtually no constitutional limit on choice-of-law. 123 Howev-
er, in Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 124 the Court stated that a choice-
of-law clause alone does not have the power to invoke the will of the
contracting parties, but is a significant factor in determining whether the
defendant purposefully availed himself of the benefits and protection of
the forum state's law.125 Thus, a contractual choice-of-law provision can
be combined with other factors to constitute sufficient significant con-
tacts. 126
The Due Process Clause also considers issues of federalism when
determining the constitutionality of a choice-of-law clause. 127 Federal-
ism ensures the forum state that foreign states will not force their legisla-
tion on the forum state. 128 The issue then becomes whether it is proper
as a matter of federalism to allow the parties' intentions to shape legisla-
tive jurisdiction.1 29 The Supreme Court has not answered this issue in
the context of choice-of-law; thus, "the definition of the boundaries has
been left to state conflicts rules."130
121. Id. at 312-13.
122. Id.
123. Friedler, supra note 111, at 500 n.153 (citing Friedrich K. Juenger, Supreme Court Interven-
tion in Jurisdiction and Choice of Law: A Dismal Prospect, 14 U.C. DAvis L. REV. 906, 916 (1981)).
See also Russell J. Weintraub, Who's Afraid of Constitutional Limitations on Choice of Law?, 10
HoSFsTA L. REv. 17, 34 (198 1) (stating that choice of law meets little, if any, constitutional scrutiny).
124. 471 U.S.462 (1985).
125. See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462,482 (1985) (utilizing the choice of law
clause for determination of jurisdiction rather than application of law).
126. See id. (finding that a choice of law clause combined with a twenty year interdependent re-
lationship between a party from the forum state and a party that had no contact with the forum state
other than the choice of law clause met the requirements of Due Process).
127. Richard J. Bauerfeld, Note, Effectiveness of Choice-of-Law Clauses in Contracts Conflict of
Law: Party Autonomy or Objective Determination?, 82 COLuM. L. REV. 1659, 1664 (1982).
128. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980).
129. Bauerfeld, supra note 127, at 1667-68.
130. Id. at 1664.
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In sum, there must be sufficient significant contacts between the
foreign state, i.e., the state chosen in a contractual choice-of-law clause,
and the parties or occurrence at issue before the forum court. Standing
by itself, a choice-of-law clause is not necessarily a sufficient significant
contact, but will be considered when the forum court is deciding whether
the foreign state has enough contacts with the contracting parties or
occurrence to warrant application of the foreign state's substantive law.
Further, the forum court's choice-of-law decision cannot be arbitrary or
unfair. Thus, a choice-of-law clause in an ARC would not likely meet
constitutional scrutiny in a situation where the only contact is the pro-
vision itself. Nonetheless, if a plaintiff purchases a general aviation
aircraft in North Dakota and enters into an ARC in North Dakota, but
litigates in a different state, there are probably enough contacts for the
forum state to constitutionally apply North Dakota's law.
2. State Scrutiny of a Choice-of-Law Clause
A state court determining the validity of a choice-of-law clause can
"(1) give determinative effect to the clause; (2) ignore the clause; or (3)
treat the clause as a relevant, but not determinative, factor."131
State courts may ignore a choice-of-law clause by deferring to for-
um state interests that override the interests of the contracting parties. 132
An overriding state interest is based on fundamental public policy. A
court is justified in voiding a choice-of-law clause if such a clause is
contrary to that state's public policy.1 33 Fundamental public policy
exceptions have considered the following: "(1) prohibitions of cove-
nants not to compete; (2) unconscionability doctrines; (3) fair dealership
131. Id. at 1660.
132. Friedler, supra note 11l, at 484. See RESTATEMENr (SECOND) oFCONFLICr OF LAWS § 187
(1971). Section 187 states that:
(1) The law of the state chosen by the parties to govern their contractual rights and
duties will be applied if the particular issue is one which the parties could have resolved
by an explicit provision in their agreement directed to that issue.
(2) The law of the state chosen by the parties to govern their contractual rights and
duties will be applied, even if the particular issue is one which the parties could not have
resolved by an explicit provision in their agreement directed to that issue, unless either
(a) the chosen state has no substantial relationship to the parties of the
transaction and there is no other reasonable basis for the parties' choice, or
(b) application of the law of the chosen state would be contrary to a
fundamental policy of a state which has a materially greater interest than
the chosen state in the determination of the particular issue and which,
under the rule of 188, would be the state of the applicable law in the
absence of an effective choice of law by the parties.
(3) In the absence of a contrary indication of intention, the reference is to the local law
of the state of the chosen law.
133. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFIuCr OF LAWS § 187(2)(b) (1971).
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laws; (4) boxing licensing schemes; (5) state bankruptcy laws; (6)
contractor licensing schemes; (7) statutes of fraud; (8) usury statutes;
and (9) insurance laws barring suicide exception clauses." 134 The fact
that there are numerous examples illustrates that courts can take advan-
tage of the fundamental policy exception under their respective choice-
of-law statutes. 135 Consequently, litigants may be compelled in cases
involving an ARC to determine whether the fundamental policy excep-
tion will be invoked by the court.136
Yet, a choice-of-law clause not only attempts to compel a forum
state to follow North Dakota's product liability laws, but also asks a
forum state to consider North Dakota's adoption of neocontractual
principles. Whether a forum state's courts will adopt the principles via
the parties' choice-of-law clause may depend on how much that court
wants to cut back on tort principles and adopt contract principles in
product liability law. Nonetheless, the choice-of-law clause forces a
court to review fundamental policy considerations, including the princi-
ples of neocontracts. Consequently, the choice-of-law clause provides an
attorney the opportunity to present to the court the virtues of neocon-
tracts which in turn may help validate the ARC.
A court would not be making a radical move in upholding an ARC.
Neocontractual principles are politically and academically attractive.137
For example, current legislative tort reform has usually forced the
consumer to rely more on contractual remedies.138 Further, in an
attempt to slow insurance rates and costs, many neocontractual reforms
have been enacted in the past decade. 139 Thus, if a court honored an
ARC, the court would be following a trend against tort law by adopting
the same neocontractual principles North Dakota has adopted.
In addition to the neocontractual movement, arguments for uphold-
ing choice-of-law clauses honoring party autonomy are making their
way into the contractual choice-of-law framework. For example, con-
tracting parties need a degree of control and predictability with their con-
tracts. 140 Honoring a contractual choice-of-law clause plays a key role
in upholding the reasonable expectations of the parties and creates
uniformity of result. 141 Business is enticed to the state where the contract-
134. Bauerfeld, supra note 127, at 1672-73 (footnotes omitted).
135. Id. at 1675.
136. See id. at 1676 (discussing public policy exception to choice of law clause).
137. Geistfeld, supra note 63, at 805.
138. Id. at 803.
139. Id. at 804-05.
140. Friedler, supra note 111, at 471. Friedler argues that party autonomy is incompatible with
modem choice of law approaches because the focus is on the state's interest rather than the contract-
ing party. Id. at 473.
141. Id.
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ing parties are allowed to choose their governing law.142 Overall, the
probable consequence of the arguments will be that state legislatures will
begin to take the lead in providing statutory solutions to the question of
the validity of choice-of-law clauses.143
For example, New York requires their courts to enforce choice
of-law clauses choosing New York state law as the governing law in a
non-consumer contract involving at least $250,000. Further, the courts
are not required to consider whether these contracts bear a reasonable
relationship to New York. 144 As a result, the courts are obliged to honor
the contractual choice-of-law clause even if neither party nor the agree-
ment have any contact with New York and even in the presence of a
fundamental policy exception.1 45 The purpose of this statute is to
enhance the status of New York as a leading financial center. 146 Also,
this type of statute directs a state to apply its own law rather than apply-
ing the law of a foreign state with significant contacts to the parties or
issue. 147 The law is limited in scope and would not extend to accept a
choice-of-law clause if an ARC would ask New York to apply North
Dakota's law. Still, New York law may demonstrate a trend toward
honoring choice-of-law clauses.
In short, the choice-of-law clause in an ARC in most cases will be
constitutional. But, parties will not be guaranteed that North Dakota's
law will be applied. 148 Still, the choice-of-law clause in the ARC allows
142. Larry E. Ribstein, Choosing Law by Contract, 18 J. CORP. L. 245,249 (1993).
143. Id. at 249-250.
144. N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAw § 5-1401 (McKinney 1989). This section provides that:
1. The parties to any contract, agreement or undertaking, contingent or otherwise, in
consideration of, or relating to any obligation arising out of a transaction covering in the
aggregate not less than two hundred fifty thousand dollars, including a transaction other-
wise covered by subsection one of section 1-105 of the uniform commercial code, may
agree that the law of this state shall govern their rights and duties in whole or in part,
whether or not such contract, agreement or undertaking bears a reasonable relation to
this state. This section shall not apply to any contract, agreement or undertaking (a) for
labor or personal services, (b) relating to any transaction for personal, family or house-
hold services, or (c) to the extent provided to the contrary in subsection two of section
1-105 of the uniform commercial code.
2. Nothing contained in this section shall be construed to limit or deny the enforcement
of any provision respecting choice of law in any other contract, agreement or under-
taking.
California has enacted a similar law. See CAL. CIr. CODE § 16465 (West Supp. 1996).
145. See N.Y GEN. OBLIO. LAW § 5-1401(1) (providing that a contract applicable to this statute
does not have to have a relationship with New York which implies that the courts would not look to a
fundamental state policy).
146. Friedler, supra 11, at 497.
147. N.Y. GEN. OaLIo. LAw § 5-1401(l)(McKinney 1989).
148. An alternative to a choice-of-law clause is a contractual provision that limits the place or
court in which the action may be brought. See generally Francis M. Dougherty, Annotation, Validity of
Contractual Provision Limiting Place or Court in Which Action May be Brought, 31 A.L.R. 4th 404
(1984) (discussing use of contracts to limit where action might be brought). A choice of forum clause
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the contracting parties to ask a forum court to consider neocontractual
principles. Once those principles are reviewed, an ARC is more likely to
be validated.
B. OTHER CONTRACTUAL CLAUSES
The choice-of-law clause is not the only clause or agreement in an
ARC. By statute, an ARC must include a dispute resolution procedure
and may include a provision for removal of the aircraft or aircraft
component from service in case of a defect. 149 The statute allows the
owner to purchase additional passenger and public risk insurance
coverage to protect third parties.150 Also, if the parties desire, the ARC
may include an Aftermarket Risk Insurance Policy (ARIP).15I If the
buyer or purchaser of a general aviation aircraft refuses to enter into an
ARC, the seller is required to purchase an ARIP.152
Additionally, the general aviation manufacturer or seller could
agree to accept their duties under tort law, but specify in an ARC what
types of damages for which the general aviation party will be liable in
the event of a breach of their tort duties.153 This agreement avoids the
problems associated with exculpatory clauses because the manufacturing
and retailing parties are still liable for negligence and strict liability.t 54
In such a situation, the parties would agree in the ARC to allow damage
payments for pecuniary losses including medical care and some part of
lost wages, but not to allow for non-pecuniary losses such as pain and
suffering, emotional distress, and lost pleasure of life. 155 The seller
could then agree in the ARC to decrease the premium added to the
aircraft price because the buyer will not expose the manufacturer to
unpredictable non-pecuniary damages.
A similar approach is proposed in medical malpractice law.156 A
company could offer two health insurance plans, one at price X under
which litigation would proceed under current rules and another plan at
price Y under which recovery could be pursued only for pecuniary
is prima facie valid if the party attacking the clause bears no additional expense, witnesses are avail-
able, the party doesn't lose a remedy, and the provision was freely bargained for. See generally id.
(citing cases).




153. See id. (the ARC statute is broad enough to include this type of agreement).
154. Cf. Tunkl v. Regents of the Univ. of California, 383 P.2d 441 (Cal. 1963) (discussing exculp-
atory clauses); Emory University v. Porubiansky, 282 S.E.2d 903 (Ga. 1981) (discussing exculpatory
clauses).
155. See generally Jeffrey O'Connell, A Proposal to Abolish Defendants' Payment for Pain and
Suffering in Return for Payment of Claimants' Attorneys' Fees, 1981 U. ILL. L. REv. 333.
156. Ruti , supra note 14, at 75-77.
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damages.157 Likewise, a general aviation seller could offer an aircraft at
price P and agree to litigation under the current rules or offer the same
aircraft at a lower price, price Q, if the buyer agrees to only hold the
general aviation manufacturer liable for pecuniary damages. The buyer
would still be able to recover punitive damages because the manufacturer
would be liable for recklessness. 158 In all other situations the contract
would be enforced.159
Yet, disclaiming non-pecuniary damages ignores the possibility that
consumers would underestimate the cost of manufacturer liability to the
point of being deprived of the benefits of the tort system. 160 But, the
purpose of the tort system is to ensure consumers compensation for their
damages while at the same time providing manufacturers the opportunity
to produce the products society demands. 161 Disclaiming non-pecuniary
damages balances the costs and benefits of the tort system and consum-
ers need to be compensated for their injuries. Also, under an ARC,
negligence and strict liability are still in place, the standard of proof isn't
modified, and the injured party will recover all pecuniary damages.1 62
The only item missing is non-pecuniary damages, which appears to cost
the general aviation industry the most and to be the amount consumers
are more unwilling to insure. Yet, whenever parties attempt to contractu-
ally limit liability, the problems of unconscionability1 63 and adhesion1 64
should be considered.
1. The Uniform Commercial Code's Limitations on an ARC
General aviation aircraft can be classified as "goods" under the
Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.).165 The U.C.C. provides that a
157. Id. at 76.
158. Id. at 14-16,74.
159. Courts have consistently held that "no written agreement can operate to allow a supplier of
defective products to avoid strict products liability." Westlye v. Look Sports, Inc., 22 Cal. Rptr.2d 781,
196 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993). However, "the doctrine of strict products liability in tort did not apply as
between parties (the manufacturer of an electric motor and the owner of a steel mill) who dealt in a
commercial setting from positions of relatively equal economic strength, bargained the specifications
of the product, and negotiated the risk of loss from defects in the product." Id. at 798 (citing Kaiser
Steel Corp. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 127 Cal. Rptr. 838, 845 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976).
160. Geistfeld, supra note 63, at 813-14.
161. See supra text accompanying notes 32-34 (defining enterprise liability and its goal).
162. See RUBIN, supra note 14, at 10-11, 14-16 (discussing contractual limitation of damages).
163. Unconscionability indicates an "absence of meaningful choice on the part of one of the par-
ties, to a contract together with contract terms which are unreasonably favorable to the other party."
BLAcK's LAW DICTIONARY 1524-25 (6th ed. 1990). See Huber, supra note 63, at 2272-77 (outlining a
good discussion on the history of unconscionability).
164. An adhesion contract is a standardized contract which is offered to consumers on a "take it
or leave it basis." BLACK's LAw DICnONARY 40 (6th ed. 1990). Under these contracts, a consumer has
no realistic opportunity to bargain. Id.
165. U.C.C. § 2-105 (1995).
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contractual limitation on consequential damages, including personal
injuries, 166 is prima facie unconscionable.1 67 As a result, to have the con-
tract enforced, the seller has the burden of establishing the validity of
any limitation by showing that the limitation "was conspicuously
printed, that it was explained to the buyer, that the parties bargained over
it, and that the buyer knew the products had a tendency to be danger-
OUS." 16 8
To avoid a finding of contract unconscionability, a seller of a
general aviation aircraft needs to conspicuously print the clause exclud-
ing liability for non-pecuniary damages and explain that clause to the
buyer. The seller must offer the aircraft at different prices, depending
on the level of liability; the buyer then chooses the level of liability and
its corresponding price. The seller may argue that the public commonly
knows the dangers of small aircraft. Also, since judges tend to be wary
of contractual limitations on liability,169 each of these steps should be
well-documented. After these steps are taken, an ARC appears to stand a
greater chance of being honored.
2. Adhesion and an ARC
There are two factors that contribute to problems of adhesion
contracts: (1) the general aviation manufacturer's status as a big indus-
try and (2) the probability that an ARC would become a standard form
contract. The problems of adhesion could be tempered upon a showing
that the contracting process gave consumers adequate opportunity to
protect themselves. 170 In the ARC situation, the buyer has the opportuni-
ty to choose the ARC contract or accept the higher price. Also, most
general aviation aircraft arguably are purchased by consumers who are
well-educated, high-salaried, and attorney-represented.' 7 1 Consequently,
an ARC gives a purchaser a choice and probably involves parties with
equal bargaining capacities.
166. § 2-715; Davidson Lumber Sales, Inc. v. Bonneville Inv., Inc., 794 P.2d 11, 15 (Utah 1990).
"[I1t is clear that consequential damages under the UCC include personal injury to a buyer
proximately resulting from a seller's breach of warranty." Di Prospero v. R. Brown & Sons, Inc., 494
N.Y.S.2d 181,182 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1985).
167. U.C.C. § 2-719(3).
168. Tuttle v. Kelly-Springfield Tire Co., 585 P.2d 1116, 1120, n.11 (Okla. 1978).
169. RBIN, supra note 14, at 74-75.
170. See generally Kenneth S. Abraham, Judge-Made Law and Judge-Made Insurance: Honor-
ing the Reasonable Expectations of the Insured, 67 VA. L. REv. 1151 (1981).
171. This generalization is derived from the fact that general aviation aircraft are expensive,
those who fly general aviation aircraft complete complicated training to receive their licenses, and
that given the cost of general aviation aircraft, the costs of hiring an attorney to assist in the purchase
of the plane would be minimal in relation to the cost of the plane.
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Adhesion problems can also be overcome by showing that one
party is in control of the product.172 In other words, manufacturers are
not in a better position to avoid losses because at the time of injury the
manufacturer does not have possession of the product. 173 Instead, the
consumer has control of the product and the ability to gather informa-
tion about the product. 174 Thus, an ARC may be capable of overcoming
the problems of adhesion.
Overall, while a choice-of-law clause in an ARC may most often be
voided by a state's fundamental policy, the rest of the contract may
consist of clauses and agreements that a forum court may uphold. For
example, state courts might uphold an agreement to choose a general
aviation aircraft at a lower price if the buyer is willing to waive the
manufacturer's liability for non-pecuniary damages. Additionally,
courts faced with the decision of upholding such an agreement are aided
by the choice-of-law clause choosing neocontractual principles. If the
parties refuse to enter into an ARC, the buyer must then buy an ARIP.
IV. AFTERMARKET RISK INSURANCE: HOLD HARMLESS
CLAUSE AND OTHER CHARACTERISTICS
North Dakota's aftermarket risk insurance law provides that an
ARIP "must hold harmless all aviation manufacturers that manufactured,
modified, maintained, repaired, or altered the aircraft or aircraft compo-
nent assembled or first sold in" North Dakota.175 The hold harmless
clause can be viewed as an exculpatory clause 176 or indemnity clause177
but does not constitute the complete ARIP statute. 178 The ARIP also
covers the owner for injuries occurring in the event of an accident
involving the aircraft.179
172. Epstein, supra note 63, at 2205.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. N.D. CENT. CODE § 26.1-48-03 (1995).
176. An exculpatory clause is "[a] contract clause which releases one of the parties from liabil-
ity for his or her wrongful act." BLACKs LAW Dc'nONARY 566 (6th ed. 1990).
177. Covenants not to sue do not apply to future or contingent claims and consequently are not in-
cluded in this discussion. Hall v. Skate Escape, Ltd., 319 S.E.2d 67, 70 (Ga. Ct. App. 1984). Also,
"exculpatory clauses must be clear and unambiguous;" "any ambiguity will be construed against the
drafter." Id.
178. North Dakota's ARIP statute provides that the ARIP option "must be attached to the original
sales contract as a lien on the aircraft." N.D. CENT. CoDa § 26.1-48-03(2). This lien holds the first
and each subsequent owner responsible for purchasing and maintaining an ARIP and an ARC. Id.
This lien must be recorded at the federal aviation administration aircraft registry. Id. When a general
aviation aircraft or aircraft component is resold, the subsequent purchaser agrees to buy and show
proof of insurance. Id. § 26.1-48-04(3). A default on the insurance by both the purchaser and subse-
quent purchaser reinstates, "by contract, the lien back to the aviation manufacturer." Id. This portion
of the ARIP statute is beyond the scope of this Note.
179. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 26.1-48-03.
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While indemnity and exculpatory clauses are generally enforceable,
courts have struck them down when they conflict with public policy.I8 0
The courts may honor the exculpatory clause in some negligence claims
involving parties who voluntarily enter into a controlling contract, but
public policy will still be the measuring stick for the validity of the
clause. 8 1 For example, in California when a party litigates a negligence
claim involving an exculpatory clause, the validity of the clause is
determined by six questions that ultimately decide whether an overriding
public policy exists.1 8 2
The first question used by California courts is whether the clause
concerns a "business of a type generally thought suitable for public
regulation."18 3 General aviation aircraft is regulated by the FAA and is
thus suitable for public regulation.
Second, is whether the party seeking exculpation is "engaged in
performing a service of great importance to the public, which is often a
matter of practical necessity for some members of the public."184
General aviation is in high demand by the public, but if general aviation
is not available to a person there are alternatives such as commercial
airlines or other ground transportation.185 Also, general aviation aircraft
are often not a matter of practical necessity because they may be pur-
chased for pleasure flying.18 6 Thus, general aviation is important to the
public, but probably not a necessity or of great importance.
Third, is whether the party holds itself "out as willing to perform
this service for any member of the public who seeks it, or at least for any
member coming within certain established standards."' 8 7 The general
aviation industry is open to those who are willing and able to pay for the
service, not necessarily to all who seek the service, and therefore may not
fit this characteristic of public policy.
"As a result of the essential nature of the service, in the economic
setting of the transaction," the fourth inquiry is whether "the party
180. Eddie Lindsay, Comment, Indemnity and Exculpation: Circle of Confusion in the Courts, 33
EMORY LJ. 135, 138-39 (1984).
181. Hong Kong Export Credit Ins. Corp. v. Dun & Bradstreet, 414 F. Supp 153, 157-58 (S.D.
N.Y. 1975); Interstate Fire Ins. Co. v. First Tape, Inc., 817 S.W.2d 142, 145 (Tex. Ct. App. 1991).
182. Tunkl v. Regents of Univ. of California, 383 P.2d 441,445-46 (Cal. 1963). California is not
the only state that provides criteria for measuring the validity of an exculpatory clause. Eg., Employ-
ers Liab. Assurance Corp. v. Greenville Business Men's Ass'n, 224 A.2d 620, 622-23 (Penn. 1966)
(stating four prerequisites similar to California's standard).
183. Tunkl, 383 P.2d at 445 (footnote omitted).
184. Id. (footnote omitted).
185. See generally STATISTICAL DATABOOK, supra note 8 (stating statistics that illustrate public
demand for general aviation aircraft).
186. Id. at 10. Of the 184,434 active general aviation aircraft, 108,749 are operated for personal
use. Id.
187. Tunkl, 383 P.2d at 445 (footnote omitted).
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invoking exculpation possesses a decisive advantage of bargaining
strength against any member of the public who seeks his services."188
The general aviation industry is in a superior bargaining position given
its status as a manufacturer of a large durable good. But, the purchase of
a general aviation aircraft does not usually involve an unsophisticated
buyer. The typical buyer must be of substantial means because a
general aviation aircraft is usually worth more than a luxury sports
car.18 9 Further, the purchaser is usually a licensed pilot, a feat which
requires hours of training. Thus, it can be argued that parties involved in
a sale/purchase of a general aviation aircraft are dealing at arm's length.
Fifth, if the party exercises "a superior bargaining power," it is
asked whether "the party confronts the public with a standardized
adhesion contract of exculpation" and makes "no provision whereby a
purchaser may pay additional reasonable fees and obtain protection
against negligence."1 90 In an ARIP, a party may be given the opportu-
nity to buy the product at the normal price or at a lower price if the
consumer is willing to purchase first-party insurance.
The final inquiry is whether, "as a result of the transaction," the
consumer is "subject to the risk of carelessness by the seller or his
agents."191 In an ARIP, the manufacturer is held harmless, but is still
regulated by other systems of deterrence, such as federal regulation and
reputation.192  Accordingly, the consumer may not be subject to un-
reasonable risks.
In sum, an ARIP presents a liability scheme that public policy
should not override because general aviation is not a necessity, the
bargaining positions of parties involved in a general aviation purchase
are almost equal, the problems of adhesion are weak, and consumer risks
are still considered. Therefore, public policy should not override an
exculpatory clause in an ARIP. Nonetheless, most states have adopted
strict liability as the standard for manufacturers, 193 and an exculpatory
clause in an ARIP may not overcome the liability extending from strict
liability.
188. Id. at 445-46 (footnote omitted).
189. For example, the cost of a new Cirrus GR20 is $140,000.00. Bradbury, supra note 15, at IA.
190. Id. at 446 (footnotes omitted).
191. Id. (footnote omitted).
192. See RuIN, supra note 14, at 49-57 (indicating that government regulations, reputation, and
liability for recklessness all combine to serve as a strong deterrence for avoiding harm creating risks
to the consumer).
193. Thomas C. Galligan Jr., Contortions Along the Boundary Between Contracts and Torts, 69
TuL. L. REv. 457,485-86 (1994). Even though most states have adopted a rule of strict liability derived
from RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 402A (1964), a draft of a new Product Liability Restatement is current-
ly being circulated and commented upon. Id. at 486 n.154.
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A. CONTRACTING OUT OF TORT LIABILITY: Two-PRICE SCHEMES
The American Law Institute recognizes the limitations of strict
liability on contract law and proposes a two-price plan that is workable
with the doctrine of strict liability.194 In a two-price plan, strict liability
would be retained unless the general aviation manufacturer "quoted two
prices to consumers, a full strict liability price and a lower no-liability
price. A consumer who paid the low price would be barred from suit
were he or she injured."1 95 This solution is consistent with an ARIP.
The consumer would have a choice of either paying full price for the
aircraft or paying much less if the buyer holds the manufacturer harm-
less.
The advantage of this solution is that the "magnitude of the differ-
ence between the two prices would inform consumers of the risk" that if
an injury were to occur, the consumer would not be able to recover
damages.196 The consumer would then be held responsible to purchase
first-party insurance to cover potential damages.
The problem with a two-price plan is that manufacturers may lose
their incentive to make optimal safety investments. 197 Yet, tort law is not
the only impetus for the general aviation industry to make optimal safety
investments. The FAA extensively regulates the general aviation indus-
try.198 Reputation is also a strong impetus for manufacturers to make a
safe product. 199 Also, in a two-price plan consumers may opt to pay for
the higher priced product holding the manufacturer liable for typical
tort liability. Thus, a two-price plan has other mechanisms in place to
motivate manufacturers to make a safe product.
However, a two-price plan may lead to situations where a general
aviation purchaser has disclaimed liability of the general aviation indus-
try but does not have first party insurance to cover damages from an
accident. "This problem could be solved by banning two-price plan
disclaimers unless the buyer has complete first-party insurance."200
194. 2 AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, supra note 13, at 522. See supra note 159 and accompanying
text (discussing the circumstances in which the doctrine of strict products liability can be contractually
modified).
195. 2 AMERICAN LAW INsTIrTUE, supra note 13, at 522.
196. Id.
197. Geistfeld, supra note 63, at 823.
198. See supra notes 29-31 and accompanying text (discussing the federal government's role in
regulating the general aviation industry).
199. RUBIN, supra note 14, at 53. The stock of a company accused of making an unsafe product
or that is compelled to recall a product, decreases in value which motivates a manufacturer to make a
safe product. Id. at 53-54.
200. 2 AMERIcAN LAW INSTITUTE, supra note 13, at 523.
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B. CONTRACTING OUT OF TORT LIABILITY: Two-PRICE SCHEMES WITH
MANDATORY FIRST-PARTY INSURANCE.
North Dakota's ARIP statute does not mandate first-party insurance
but allows an ARIP to be included with an ARC.201 Specifically, North
Dakota's ARC statute provides that contracting parties "shall" either
enter into an ARC or purchase an ARIP. 202 If a party refuses to enter
into an ARC, then the language of the ARC statute seems to mandate that
the party purchase an ARIP which in turn must hold all aviation manu-
facturers harmless. 20 3 Thus, an ARIP that is attached to an ARC fits the
two-price plan; whereas an ARIP standing by itself fits the description of
a two-price plan with mandatory insurance.
In a mandatory insurance plan, a purchaser of a general aviation
aircraft would be allowed to buy the aircraft at a lower price if she has
first-party insurance and agrees to hold the aviation manufacturer
harmless. Yet, one problem is enforcing this requirement. 204 For
example, a policyholder could buy the policy at the time of purchase
then allow the policy to default a few months later. North Dakota's
solution is to attach the ARIP to the ARC as a lien. 205 The lien holds the
first and subsequent owners financially responsible for maintaining an
ARIP and is recorded with the federal administration registry.206 "A
default on the insurance may reinstate, by contract, the lien back to the
aviation manufacturer." 207 Also, the purchaser who in turn sells the
used general aviation aircraft always has the option of selling the aircraft
"as is," which may relieve the manufacturer of liability .208
Thus, both a two-price plan and mandatory first-party insurance
are viable possibilities for an ARIP. Since these plans are just beginning
to be proposed as alternatives, the courts have not had a chance to judge
the validity of such a plan. However, principles to which the courts
201. N.D. CENT. CODE § 26.1-48-03(2) (1995). If an ARIP is included in an ARC, the ARIP must
be attached to the ARC as a lien holding all owners responsible for owning an ARIP. This lien also
reverts the lien back to the manufacturer if the owner defaults on the policy. Id. § 26.1-48-04.
202. § 26.1-48-02.
203. § 26.1-48-03(1).
204. 2 AMERCAN LAw INsrrruTE, supra note 13, at 524. The Institute discusses other difficulties
with this scheme and suggests that a two-price scheme without mandatory insurance is the better
option. Id.
205. See supra note 178 and accompanying text (discussing North Dakota's requirements for a
general aviation lien).
206. N.D. CENT. CODE § 26.1-48-03 (1995).
207. § 26.1-48-04(3) (1995). An analysis of a lien in this situation is beyond the scope of this
Note.
208. Keystone Aeronautics Corp. v. R. J. Enstrom Corp., 499 F.2d 146 (3d Cir. 1974) (noting that
freely negotiated and clearly expressed waivers of strict liability between business entities of relative-
ly equal bargaining strength are allowed under Pennsylvania law, but finding that clause in case did
not present a clearly expressed waiver).
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commonly adhere cooperate with the two-price plans, which indicates
that an ARIP may help the general aviation industry.
V. CONCLUSION
The general aviation industry once seemed to be headed toward
growth approaching that of the auto industry. Tort judgments awarded
against the aviation industry, based on the principle that manufacturers
should be liable for all risks to consumers, has nearly smothered the
once lively general aviation industry. The industry was forced to tack
costs associated with tort liability onto the price of the plane. This drove
up the cost of a small aircraft beyond what consumers were willing to
pay, and the general aviation industry quickly declined.
In response to tort demands causing the industry's plight, it has
been argued by a neocontractual movement that contract law should
accompany tort law in the realm of product liability. North Dakota,
through the use of the ARC and ARIP, adopts the principles of the
neocontractual movement. The ARC consists of a choice-of-law clause
that attempts to export North Dakota's disputable presumption, statute of
repose, and state-of-art defense. The ARC also attempts to export
neocontractual principles.
Other parts of the ARC and ARIP statutes are based on more
plausible and acceptable solutions. Instead of focusing on broad waivers
of liability or choice-of-law clauses, which may well be too much for
courts to swallow, a less sweeping and seemingly less one-sided departure
from the dictates of the tort system are defensible if steps are carefully
taken and proper record is made.209
The careful approach is to maintain the manufacturer's legal duties
while allowing the purchasing parties to determine how much they are
willing to hold the manufacturer liable in return for a reduced price on
the product. Another careful approach is a two-price plan; a lower
no-liability price and higher full-liability price. The consumer is warned
of the lack of coverage by the extreme difference between the full-liabil-
ity price and the no-liability price. A two-price plan with mandatory
insurance is another careful approach. This approach presents the con-
sumer with a lower price if the consumer presents proof of insurance. A
higher, full-liability price is charged if the consumer does not have
insurance. Any of these approaches are possible solutions to lift an ARC
or ARIP into workable tort reform. This in turn will benefit the general
209. See generally Clark C. Havighurst, Private Reform of Tort-Law Dogma: Market Opportun-
ities and Legal Obstacles, 49 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 143, 163-170 (1986) (discussing barriers that
modifications of liability have met).
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aviation industry, the most likely industry to accept tort reform by
adopting contract principles into the realm of product liability.21
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